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Open Access Journal Article

Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

by David Martin 1,*
1
David Martin
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
EFRL  2020 2(1):6; https://doi.org/10.69610/j.efrl.20200213
Received: 8 January 2020 / Accepted: 23 January 2020 / Published Online: 13 February 2020
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Abstract

The paper explores the intricate relationship between corporate governance structures and the overall performance of firms. It argues that effective governance mechanisms play a vital role in shaping the strategic direction, risk management, and financial outcomes of corporations. The analysis is based on a comprehensive review of existing literature, employing empirical evidence from various industries and geographical locations. The study finds that boards of directors, executive compensation, ownership structure, and disclosure practices are key determinants of firm performance. Furthermore, the research reveals that firms with stronger governance frameworks tend to exhibit higher profitability, lower volatility, and better long-term growth prospects. The paper concludes with recommendations for policymakers and corporate leaders to enhance the governance practices that foster sustainable organizational success.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Firm Performance; Board of Directors; Ownership Structure; Executive Compensation.;
Copyright: © 2020 by Martin. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) (Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
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APA Style
Martin, D. (2020). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Economics and Finance Research Letters, 2(1), 6. doi:10.69610/j.efrl.20200213
ACS Style
Martin, D. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Economics and Finance Research Letters, 2020, 2, 6. doi:10.69610/j.efrl.20200213
AMA Style
Martin D. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Economics and Finance Research Letters; 2020, 2(1):6. doi:10.69610/j.efrl.20200213
Chicago/Turabian Style
Martin, David 2020. "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance" Economics and Finance Research Letters 2, no.1:6. doi:10.69610/j.efrl.20200213

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ACS Style
Martin, D. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Economics and Finance Research Letters, 2020, 2, 6. doi:10.69610/j.efrl.20200213
AMA Style
Martin D. Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Economics and Finance Research Letters; 2020, 2(1):6. doi:10.69610/j.efrl.20200213
Chicago/Turabian Style
Martin, David 2020. "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance" Economics and Finance Research Letters 2, no.1:6. doi:10.69610/j.efrl.20200213
APA style
Martin, D. (2020). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. Economics and Finance Research Letters, 2(1), 6. doi:10.69610/j.efrl.20200213

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